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A widespread currency war is in prospect. The term was first 
introduced by Guido Mantega, the finance minster of Brazil. 
He envisaged the International Monetary Fund (IMF) devel-
oping an index that measures whether currencies are held arti-
ficially low to boost exports (popularly referred to as “currency 
manipulation”).1 If that IMF exercise did not lead to an easing 
of such exchange market intervention, he suggested that an 
undervalued exchange rate could eventually be considered a 
commercial subsidy. 
Many  countries,  including  Brazil,  China,  India, 
Indonesia,  Israel,  Japan,  Korea,  Malaysia,  the  Philippines, 
Singapore, South Africa, Switzerland, Taiwan, and Thailand,2 
are  reported  recently  to  have  engaged  in  exchange  market 
intervention and/or capital controls to curb currency appre-
ciation.  There  are  fears  that  currency  appreciation  may  be 
worsened by the additional quantitative easing (the so-called 
QE2) in the United States. Because many countries are simul-
taneously seeking to improve their trade position, either (or 
both) because they regard themselves as short of aggregate 
1. According to a report in the Brazilian newspaper O Globo. 
2. All these countries have been mentioned in press references; see appendix B.
demand  or  because  their  existing  current  account  position 
is weaker than they would wish, many countries are seeking 
a more competitive exchange rate. The laws of mathematics 
mean that some must be disappointed: A weaker exchange rate 
of one country implies a stronger rate of some other country 
or countries. The questions are, Who is to accept this outcome 
and how will it be decided who that is to be?
The aim of this policy brief is to illuminate how such issues 
should be determined. The first section of this paper considers 
where the world is now and how it got there. The second section 
updates information on the levels of effective exchange rates in 
comparison with the fundamental equilibrium exchange rate 
(FEER) targets identified in our most recent set of estimates 
(Cline and Williamson 2010). This section then examines the 
pattern of exchange rate intervention and considers where it is 
consistent with, and contradictory to, systemically benign inter-
vention in view of present departures from FEERs. The third 
section seeks to broaden the analysis by explaining the relevance 
of a widely accepted economic theory that asserts that coun-
tries3 should pursue macroeconomic policies for both internal 
and external balance. The fourth section examines the nature of 
needed adjustments if that theory is accepted. The final section 
draws out the policy implications for how to rebalance global 
demand,  using  our  own  estimates  of  where  exchange  rates 
should be, as well as estimates of the strength of demand in 
different parts of the world.
The World of Today
The  postwar  international  monetary  system  was  designed 
at Bretton Woods. It involved administered exchange rates, 
with changes permitted only with IMF approval and when 
a country could no longer achieve reasonable internal and 
external balance at its existing exchange rate. The incentive 
to  adjust  was  provided  by  the  reserve  stock,  with  too  few 
reserves signifying a need to restrain demand and/or devalue 
3.  The word “countries” is used to signify areas with a common currency, 
although both in Europe and East Asia these are not always the same as 
countries. 
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and the United States given an obligation to maintain the gold 
convertibility of the dollar in return for the dollar’s reserve 
role. There were those who doubted that the dollar could be 
devalued  against  other  currencies  because  other  countries 
would match any dollar devaluation against gold, but legally 
the IMF could have forbidden this in fulfilling its duty of 
supervising the exchange rate system.
The Bretton Woods system collapsed when the United 
States  accepted  that  it  could  no  longer  maintain  the  gold 
convertibility of the dollar in August 1971. Shortly after that 
the then-major powers all started to float, but many of the 
emerging-market economies continued to peg to the dollar. 
But they did this without effective surveillance by the IMF, 
which had formerly been responsible for approving any admin-
istered change in exchange rate but which now had to operate 
under a set of rules that said that any exchange rate regime 
was permissible except pegging to gold (which no country 
was foolish enough to consider anyway). True, the United 
States insisted on inserting a requirement in the guidelines 
for floating that countries with floating currencies consider 
the interests of the country whose currency they planned to 
use when intervening, but it was not clear that this applied to 
currencies that pegged. In any event it has not prevented the 
proprietors of those currencies from viewing the value of their 
peg as a sovereign decision in which other countries, including 
the  issuers  of  their  reserve  currencies,  are  not  entitled  to 
interfere. To the extent that they did not regularly revalue to 
reflect the Balassa-Samuelson presumption that a fast-growing 
country  needs  an  appreciating  real  exchange  rate  to  avoid 
undervaluation from developing (which was reinforced by a 
desire for current account surpluses to “self-insure” following 
the East Asian crisis), they became undervalued.
UpdaTed effecTive exchange raTes and 
paTTerns of inTervenTion
It was in this environment of an exchange rate free-for-all that 
we have for the past two years been calculating and releasing 
estimates of FEERs. The most recent of these was released in 
June (Cline and Williamson 2010) based on exchange rates as 
of May 2010 and medium-term current account projections in 
the April issue of the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO). 
The dollar had at that time been buoyed by a safe haven effect 
as a consequence of market concern about European sovereign 
debt. The relaxation of this concern after May set the stage for 
an easing in the dollar. Subsequent doubts about the robust-
ness of the US recovery and, especially, expectations prompted 
by the prospect of new US monetary easing (the second dose 
of quantitative easing, dubbed QE2), have further contrib-
uted to a substantial easing in the dollar against most other 
floating currencies by October (table 1).4
We have not felt it necessary to calculate a new set of 
FEERs, since the October issue of the WEO did not make 
major  changes  in  its  projections  of  medium-run  current 
account balances for any country except Singapore (see the 
comparisons in appendix table A.1), and inflation in almost 
every case is low. Table 1 therefore reports merely the May 
and October levels of real effective exchange rate indexes for 
the 30 countries for which we have been calculating FEERs;5 
the changes needed to reach equilibrium as calculated in May; 
and the new set of changes needed to reach equilibrium as 
of October, assuming that the FEER is unchanged. The final 
column states whether we judge a currency to be overvalued 
(O), undervalued (U), or within 2.5 percent of equilibrium 
(E).  Appendix  table  A.2  reports  the  corresponding  levels 
of  FEER-consistent  exchange  rates  against  the  dollar.  (For 
purposes of table 1, in October the dollar met the criterion for 
equilibrium (E), being only 2.5 percent overvalued.)
For the United States, which was estimated in our June 
policy brief to be in need of a devaluation of almost 8 percent, 
there has been a reduction in the REER by over 5 percent, 
leaving only a marginal further change until it reaches equi-
librium.6 In contrast, the Chinese renminbi is even further 
from equilibrium than in May because its ballyhooed appre-
ciation  against  the  dollar  since  its  “flexibilization”  in  June 
has  not  even  balanced  its  depreciation  against  most  other 
4. From the end of May to the end of August, the dollar fell by 1.6 percent 
against major currencies on the Federal Reserve’s broad nominal index (Federal 
Reserve 2010). The timing of the steep subsequent decline by 5.3 percent 
from end-August to October 14 suggests a major role for QE2 expectations 
following the Jackson Hole speech of Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke 
in late August. 
5. The real effective exchange rate indexes presented here have a base of the 
average for 2007 as 100 and apply the matrix of trade weights reported in 
Cline (2008). For each country, changes in partner exchange rates (after taking 
account of the difference between country and partner inflation) are weighted 
by the share of the partner country in imports and exports of the country in 
question.
6. However, some may wonder whether the IMF’s projection of the US 
current account deficit on which that estimate was based—which foresaw a 
reduction in the US deficit in prospect, followed by a very modest rise out to 
2015—may not have been unrealistically small. 
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currencies. The set of other East Asian currencies that were 
severely undervalued in May have not changed greatly: For 
Malaysia the desirable correction is approximately the same 
as before, for Hong Kong and Taiwan it is somewhat greater, 
and for Singapore it is somewhat less. The euro and the yen, 
along with all other floating currencies, except the Philippine 
peso and the New Taiwan dollar, have appreciated. Quite a 
number, including the euro and yen, have become overvalued. 
A  number  that  were  seriously  overvalued  before,  like  the 
Australian and New Zealand dollars, the South African rand, 
and the Brazilian real, have become even more overvalued. 
The only good news, apart from the reduction in the dollar’s 
overvaluation, is elimination of the Swedish undervaluation 
and a reduction in the Swiss undervaluation.
A straightforward metric for judging whether intervention 
can be regarded as antisocial or, instead, a warranted effort to 
prevent widening of misalignments is to consider the pattern 
of exchange rate interventions in relationship to the level of 









Argentina 91.4 –2.9 87.2 1.8 E
Australia 104.0 –16.1 111.7 –21.9 O
Brazil 119.4 –5.9 122.6 –8.3 O
Canada 101.9 –0.6 103.0 –1.6 E
Chile 102.0 –2.6 107.1 –7.2 O
China 113.9 13.5 110.2 17.3 U
Colombia 112.2 –2.3 117.3 –6.6 O
Czech Republic 110.6 –1.1 115.9 –5.6 O
Euro area 95.1 –2.5 98.1 –5.5 O
Hong Kong 95.6 6.8 90.8 12.5 U
Hungary 97.7 –1.1 99.7 –3.1 O
India 112.0 –1.8 114.0 –3.6 O
Indonesia 106.0 –2.0 105.4 –1.4 E
Israel 116.3 –1.4 116.6 –1.7 E
Japan 118.8 –2.0 126.9 –8.2 O
Korea 78.6 –1.8 78.7 –1.9 E
Malaysia 102.5 12.5 102.1 13.0 U
Mexico 93.2 –0.8 94.7 –2.4 E
New Zealand 94.3 –24.7 94.8 –25.0 O
Philippines 107.2 –1.7 107.1 –1.6 E
Poland 96.3 –1.3 100.1 –5.0 O
Singapore 108.7 32.0 111.4 28.9 U
South Africa 109.1 –15.7 113.3 –18.8 O
Sweden 92.7 8.3 98.7 1.7 E
Switzerland 110.3 11.5 116.7 5.4 U
Taiwan 95.7 8.0 94.6 9.4 U
Thailand 102.6 –2.0 104.6 –3.9 O
Turkey 106.3 –11.7 109.1 –14.1 O
United Kingdom 79.1 –1.4 79.2 –1.4 E
United States 99.1 –7.8 93.8 –2.5 E
Source: Columns 1 and 3 are Cline’s index of real effective exchange rates (REERs) with index 2007 = 100, and columns 2 and 4 are percentage changes in REERs 
needed to reach estimated fundamental equilibrium exchange rates. Column 5 classifies a country as overvalued (O) if it was more than 2.5 percent above the 
estimated equilibrium in October 2010, U if it was more than 2.5 percent below, and E if it was within 2.5 percent of equilibrium.N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 2 6   No v e m b e r   2 0 1 0
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the currencies in question vis-à-vis their FEER levels. In short, 
if a currency is substantially undervalued and the country is 
aggressively engaging in intervention to prevent appreciation, 
it is reasonable to judge that its intervention is unjustifiable. If 
instead the country is already overvalued relative to its FEER, 
currency intervention to prevent further appreciation may be 
seen as benign and consistent with cooperative international 
behavior.
Table 2 draws upon recent press reports to identify coun-
tries by three categories of exchange rate intervention: purchase 
of foreign currency to prevent appreciation; broad absence of 
intervention activity; and sale of foreign exchange to prevent 
depreciation. In addition, it classifies countries according to 
three categories of exchange rate position relative to the FEER 
target: undervaluation, approximate equilibrium, and overvalu-
ation. The three columns correspond respectively to identifica-
tion as U, E, and O in the final column of table 1.
It is clear in the table that none of the countries has been 
engaging in major efforts to prevent depreciation through the 
selling of reserves. Thus, there are no entries in the third row 
of the table. It is equally clear, however, that a large number 
of  countries  have  been  engaged  in  intervention  to  prevent 
appreciation. Seventeen economies are located in the first row 
of the table, more than half of the economies examined. But the 
three separate columns make it clear that whereas a number of 
these economies have some justification for intervening, only a 
handful of high-surplus economies are intervening in a fashion 
that is perverse for the reduction of international imbalances. 
These are the principal economies with major undervaluations 
of  currencies  (and  correspondingly  large  excesses  of  current 
account surpluses over targets from international norms) that 
are nonetheless preventing market correction of currency valu-
ation. China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Switzerland, 
and Taiwan are in this category.
In  contrast,  at  the  opposite  extreme  are  countries  with 
already overvalued currencies that are intervening in an effort to 
prevent them from becoming even more overvalued. Brazil and 
Japan, two of the most prominent countries in the recent inter-
national debate about currency wars, are in this position. Their 
intervention should be viewed as benign because it prevents still 
greater distortions in international imbalances. One might also 
regard as benign interventions to prevent further appreciation 
by a number of economies that are near their FEER. Korea 
is an important example in this category, because rather than 
pursuing unfair competition against Japan through competitive 
depreciation (as some Japanese officials appear to believe), the 
country is merely seeking to prevent appreciation that boosts 
the currency well above the equilibrium level.7
The second row of table 2 reports several countries that 
appear to have refrained from currency market intervention. 
These include countries that are highly overvalued (Australia, 
New Zealand), as well as moderately overvalued (the eurozone), 
in addition to several important countries that are at approximate 
exchange rate equilibrium as measured by FEERs (including 
Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States).
7. Japanese Finance Minister Yoshihiko Noda has stated that Korea’s leader-
ship as current chair of the G-20 will be “seriously questioned” because of its 
intervention to prevent appreciation of the won (News Center 2010). 
Table 2     Country categorization by currency under- (over-) valuation in October 2010 and exchange 
  rate intervention in recent months
Undervalued Approximate equilibrium Overvalued
Intervened to prevent appreciation China, Hong Kong,1 Malaysia, 
Singapore, Switzerland, Taiwan
Argentina, Indonesia, Israel, 
Korea, Philippines
Brazil, India, Japan, South 
Africa, Thailand, Turkey
No apparent intervention Canada, Mexico, Sweden, 
United Kingdom, United States
Australia, Chile, Colombia, 
Czech Republic, euro area, 
Hungary, New Zealand, Poland
Intervened to prevent depreciation … … …
1. Because Hong Kong’s currency board pegs the exchange rate to the dollar, and because Hong Kong has been running large current account surpluses, the 
economy is automatically considered to be in the category of intervention to prevent appreciation.
Source: See appendix B.
Countries that are already overvalued 
on an effective basis—primarily 
floating emerging-market economies, 
but also Australia and New Zealand—
should not be condemned for 
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The broad policy thrust of table 2 is the diagnosis that 
although  many  countries  have  been  intervening,  most  of 
them are in the category of pursuing warranted intervention 
to prevent the exchange rate from being pushed further away 
from a level consistent with external balance (as judged by 
our limits of ±3 percent of GDP for the current account in 
identifying FEERs; see Cline and Williamson 2010). The key 
exceptions are the six major undervalued currencies in the 
cell in row 1 and column 1. It is quite wrong to condemn 
countries for resisting appreciation irrespective of their situa-
tion. Any agreement reached at Seoul to prevent an exchange 
rate war should be based on a distinction between countries 
with overvalued and undervalued currencies and should be 
designed to seek appreciation of the latter but not to debar 
the former from actions to prevent a further magnification of 
disequilibrium.
Countries  that  are  already  overvalued  on  an  effective 
basis—primarily  floating  emerging-market  economies,  but 
also Australia and New Zealand—should not be condemned 
for resisting further appreciation. The question is sometimes 
asked as to why a country with adequate reserves does not 
simply let the currency appreciate. The usual answer is that 
many countries, especially those not fully developed, desire 
to protect their export sector (so as to avoid succumbing to 
Dutch disease). This seems to us to be a legitimate reason.
The implicaTions of meadean Theory
The G-20 is reported to be concerned about the prospect of 
a currency war. At the same time, it is to be hoped that any 
resolution will be based on principles, not power. We aim in 
what follows to elucidate what we regard as the principles 
that should underpin any G-20 resolution of this question. 
Presumably some economists do not accept the framework 
that we find natural for discussing this issue. They are welcome 
to lay out what they regard as a competitive framework, so 
that it can be compared and judged.
The framework on which we base our analysis is the one 
presented by James Meade (1951), who postulated that each 
country has two objectives of its macroeconomic policy, which 
he described as internal balance (IB) and external balance (EB). 
IB was in Meade’s day thought of as a full employment level of 
output. A bit later, when the Phillips curve had come along, 
it was described as the optimal combination of employment 
and inflation. A little later still, after the expectations revolu-
tion had convinced most of the profession that an attempt 
to hold unemployment below the natural rate implied ever-
accelerating inflation, IB was conceived as having unemploy-
ment at the natural rate. To those who recognize that there are 
dynamic questions involved, IB is today thought of as the level 
of demand implied by a Taylor Rule.8 
EB was in Meade’s day thought of as a zero change in 
reserves, where the current account balance matched the essen-
tially exogenous inflow or outflow of capital. This has subse-
quently been generalized in two ways: by recognizing that the 
flow of capital is influenced by one of the same variables that 
helps determine the current account, namely the (relative) rate 
of interest, and by recognizing that the policy objective may 
be a secular increase in the reserve level (to reflect growth and/
or for self-insurance motives). Today most industrial countries 
and  (arguably)  also  many  emerging-market  economies  can 
essentially borrow or lend unlimited sums, but a concern to 
maintain intertemporal solvency dictates, or should dictate, 
that they limit current account deficits to 3 or 4 percent of 
GDP. EB for a deficit country can be thought of as main-
taining the current account deficit at less than this level.
That still leaves the issue of defining EB for a surplus 
country.  There  are  two  approaches.  One,  which  we  have 
adopted in the past, is to lay down rules that are in some sense 
symmetrical to those for deficit countries and hope that these 
will result in a roughly balanced outcome. The alternative is to 
add up the deficits implied by the rules specified and recognize 
that this is the sum available for surpluses. The question then 
becomes how that surplus should be distributed. The alter-
natives seem to be: negotiation (in the G-20? in the IMF?); 
cutting down the peak surpluses (presumably relative to GDP) 
to a uniform level; cutting down all surpluses (or perhaps all 
surpluses above a certain level) by an equal proportion; and 
some mix of these.
The part of Meade’s analysis that is widely remembered is 
how to use available policy tools to achieve the two targets of 
8. The Taylor Rule states that the federal funds rate is set at the target real 
interest rate (k) plus the recent inflation rate (p), plus a coefficient (a) times 
the percent by which real GDP exceeds its trend level, plus a coefficient (b) 
times the amount by which the recent inflation rate exceeds the target infla-
tion rate (p). He found that for 1987–92, a good fit was obtained with k = p = 
2 percent and a = b = 0.5. Taylor (1993, 202).
We are Meadean in the sense that we 
think it important to be reasonably 
close to both IB [internal balance] and 
EB [external balance], and that this 
requires appropriate levels of both fiscal-
monetary policy and exchange rates.N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 2 6   No v e m b e r   2 0 1 0
6
IB and EB. Meade argued in terms of how to manage exchange 
rates, along with fiscal-monetary policy, to that end. A signifi-
cant generalization was achieved by Harry Johnson (1961). He 
showed that one needed both an expenditure-switching and 
an  expenditure-changing  instrument  to  achieve  both  objec-
tives simultaneously.9 Expenditure-switching policies are those 
which leave the total level of demand unchanged but redirect it 
from country A’s goods to those produced by country B. This 
is true for exchange rate changes, but it is also true of changes 
in the level of protection; these are ruled out as undesirable 
not because they could not serve the function of changing the 
direction of expenditure, but because in doing so they would 
cause a loss of real (world) income. Conversely, expenditure-
changing policies are those that have no first-order effects on 
where money is spent but influence instead the overall level of 
spending, such as fiscal policy and monetary policy, but also 
(insofar as it is a policy variable) the level of credit expansion,
We are Meadean in the sense that we think it impor-
tant to be reasonably close to both IB and EB, and that this 
requires appropriate levels of both fiscal-monetary policy and 
exchange rates. Specifically, as illustrated in figure 1, a country 
9. This fact has not prevented critics of the use of exchange rate policy from 
asserting that to advocate an exchange rate change is to claim that no other 
policy change is required.
may be in four zones of disequilibrium (or in a borderline 
situation where it satisfies either the IB or EB requirement, or 
conceivably at the bliss point B where it satisfies both). If it is 
in zone I, it needs to devalue; whether it needs to expand or 
contract demand is ambiguous. In zone II, it needs to expand 
demand,  though  whether  it  needs  to  devalue,  revalue,  or 
neither is ambiguous. In zone III it needs to revalue for the 
sake of approaching both IB and EB (in the old literature, 
this was referred to as a nondilemma case, because with regard 
to  exchange  rate  policy  a  country  did  not  have  to  choose 
between satisfying external and internal objectives, the same 
policy could advance both). In zone IV it needs to contract 
demand but faces a dilemma with regard to exchange rate 
policy, where it would need to devalue to approach EB and 
revalue to approach IB.
The presenT siTUaTion
The world situation can be translated into where the different 
countries  are  in  figure  1.  Note  that  “the”  exchange  rate 
portrayed there is the effective exchange rate shown in table 
1 and column 1 of table 3, rather than the dollar rate whose 
disequilibrium is shown in column 2,10 since it is the effective 









































































EM = emerging-market economies
Source: The analysis of Meade (1951) as portrayed in Swan (1960). 
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rate that is the relevant determinant of a country’s macroeco-
nomic situation.
Internal  balance  was  calculated  as  follows.  The  IMF 
includes  a  measure  of  excess  capacity  for  some  industrial 
countries  in  its  WEO  and  the  OECD  publishes  estimates 
for its member countries (see appendix table A.3); the figures 
for 2011 are averaged when both are available, or just the 
OECD figure is taken when there is no WEO number. The 
country is designated as having excess capacity if its (aver-
aged) output gap (negative) exceeds 1 percent of GDP. For 
the remaining countries, the IMF’s projection of 2015 growth 
was taken to be its measure of trend growth. It was assumed 
that capacity grew at 80 percent of this trend rate over the five 
years 2007–11, with the reduction designed to take account of 
lesser capital formation during the Great Recession. If actual 
growth over this period resulted in 2011 output more than 5 
percent short of the level indicated by this potential growth 
rate, the country was declared to be suffering excess capacity; 
conversely, where 2011 output was larger than indicated by 
potential, or less than 5 percent short, it was assumed to be in 
or close to internal balance. 
Since most industrial countries have a shortage of demand, 
they lie to the left of IB in figure 1. Not only is aggregate 
demand less than desired, but the opportunities of fiscal expan-
sion  are  severely  circumscribed  by  the  bond  market  and/or 
concerns about fiscal sustainability (and in some cases by ideo-
logical beliefs). The United States and possibly also the United 
Kingdom will proceed with further monetary expansion, but 
the chances of this having much impact on demand other than 
via the exchange rate do not appear high. The fact is that the 
effective exchange rates of most industrial countries, with the 
notable exception of Australia and New Zealand, are not far 
from  equilibrium,  with  the  effective  overvaluations  of  most 
being  largely  explained  by  the  continued  undervaluation  of 
China and its East Asian satellites. Australia is unusual among 
industrial countries in being on the IB curve. Since Australia 
is overvalued it is to the right and above B. The only indus-
trial-country currency that we judge as undervalued is that of 
Switzerland.11
A second group of countries is those emerging-market 
economies and developing countries with floating currencies. 
Most have strong (but not excessive) demand, which means 
that they lie on the IB curve. The shortages from which they 
still suffer are supply-side, and would not be alleviated by an 
increase in demand. The fact that most are overvalued means 
that they lie above and to the right of B, like Australia. Many 
are concerned to protect their export sectors, since they like 
export-led growth.
11. Note, however, that according to the Economist’s latest Big Mac index 
(published in their issue of October 16) it is the most overvalued currency. 
The difference depends upon the definition used. Because Switzerland is a 
large external creditor, it needs to revalue in order to reach EB (hence Cline-
Williamson); because it is already a costly country (as anyone who has stayed in 
a Swiss hotel recently can confirm), it would need to devalue in order to achieve 
comparable costs (Big Mac). Since the relevant question is achieving EB and 
IB, we put Switzerland below the horizontal line through B. To do otherwise 
suggests that it is just fine for a country that is already a substantial creditor to 
continue increasing its assets/GDP ratio. More generally, we do not consider 
purchasing power parity to be a useful basis for judging over- or undervaluation 
for purposes of external imbalances (see Cline and Williamson 2008).














Czech Republic 5.6 10.8
Euro area 5.5 5.7



















United Kingdom 1.4 4.2
United States 2.5 0
Note: Percent change in the dollar rate to reach the FEER-consistent dollar rate, 
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A  third  group  of  countries  is  those  emerging-market 
economies  and  developing  countries  (of  which  the  most 
conspicuous is China) which have heavily managed exchange 
rates.  For  reasons  explained  previously,  these  tend  to  have 
highly undervalued exchange rates. These countries also have 
healthy levels of demand, and they therefore lie on the IB 
curve, on the border between zones II and III. In some cases 
demand might even be considered excessive, putting them to 
the right of IB.
Finally there is the United States. Clearly it lies to the 
left of IB. The Cline-Williamson index places it as slightly 
overvalued, and identifies the source of the overvaluation as 
exclusively against the third group of countries. Indeed, the 
dollar is undervalued relative to the majority of other curren-
cies, as shown in the final column of table 3.
deriving policy implicaTions linking 
exTernal and inTernal Balance
The  policy  implications  for  each  of  our  30  countries  are 
shown in table 4. A conspicuous feature is that almost all the 
industrial countries (except Australia) are shown as short of 
aggregate demand. In contrast, most of the emerging-market 
economies and developing countries have adequate demand 
and high rates of growth (the exceptions being Czech Republic, 
Hungary, and Mexico).
A  major  reason  for  this  contrast  is  to  be  found  in  the 
exchange rate policy of Group III. (It is not the whole expla-
nation, because a number of emerging-market economies like 
Brazil have overvalued exchange rates and still enjoy robust 
growth.) The competitive exchange rates of Group III serve to 
divert demand away from the industrial countries and toward 
Group III. 
As discussed above, our analysis points clearly to the desir-
ability of revaluation by China and a number of other East 
Asian currencies. Since China lies on the IB curve, however, 
it  needs  to  accompany  revaluation  by  actions  to  stimulate 
domestic demand. In other words, a vertical move upward for 
China in figure 1, toward currency appreciation alone, would 
initially leave the economy to the left of its IB line, moving it 
into excess domestic supply. What effect would a corrective 
combination of revaluation with domestic stimulus policies 
have on Chinese welfare?
First, note that China has the potential to expand demand 
domestically. There are myriad unmet needs in China, in partic-
ular  involving  improved  social  security  and  public  pensions 
(see Bergsten, Freeman, Lardy and Mitchell 2009, chapter 6). 
Increasing these might reduce private as well as public saving, 
insofar as private saving is motivated by precautionary consid-
erations. And there is no political or bond market constraint on 
increased public expenditure, of the sort that rules out further 
fiscal expansion in so many industrial countries. Second, note 
that a replacement of foreign demand by domestic demand 
could  be  expected  to  increase  rather  than  reduce  domestic 
employment.  The  effect  on  the  growth  of  GDP  is  perhaps 
ambiguous,  since  it  is  widely  believed  that  the  growth  of 












Czech Republic ES –
Euro area ES –



















United Kingdom ES Nil
United States ES Nil
IB = internal balance.
ES = excess supply.
Note: Countries with overvalued currencies are marked – in the final 
column; those with undervalued currencies are marked +; and those 
within 2.5 percent of estimated equilibrium are marked Nil.
Sources: Table 1; OECD (2010); IMF (2010); and authors’ calculations.N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 2 6   No v e m b e r   2 0 1 0
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manufacturing has beneficent externalities. But the effect of 
redirecting demand from the capital-intensive manufacturing 
sector  to  the  relatively  labor-intensive  services  sector  would 
increase the demand for labor per unit of capital investment. 
So it is not true that defense of employment provides a valid 
reason for China to resist an appreciation. That argument is 
based on the fallacy of assuming that revaluation would occur in 
isolation, rather than being undertaken in conjunction with an 
expenditure-increasing policy. Third, note the presumption that 
welfare would increase, as current expenditure for the benefit 
of Chinese consumers would rise and replace the low-return 
accumulation of US securities. Fourth, note that this is exactly 
what is meant by “rebalancing” world demand.
The  other  part  of  what  is  required  to  rebalance  world 
demand is a decline in US consumption (and that of other 
deficit  countries)  relative  to  what  was  experienced  in  the 
precrisis years. This does not require a depression of consump-
tion at the present time, since output is depressed below its 
full-potential level. But as and when US output recovers, it will 
have to undertake a similar contractionary fiscal policy to that 
already launched in many countries of Europe. This would seem 
a sensible quid pro quo for emerging-market economies to seek 
in Seoul.
conclUding remarks
Two important policy conclusions emerge from this analysis:
1.  It would be very wrong for the G-20 to condemn all 
countries that are trying to prevent their exchange rates 
from appreciating. One needs to ask which currencies are 
undervalued and concentrate on preventing their inter-
vening and tightening capital controls.
2.  It  is  a  fallacy  to  regard  exchange  rate  correction  and 
actions  to  change  the  level  of  demand  as  alternatives 
and to welcome the latter as more profound than “mere” 
exchange  rate  changes.  The  two  are  complementary. 
The  G-20  should  recognize  that  the  world  needs  an 
appropriate combination of both if it is to succeed in 
rebalancing  world  demand  while  restoring  worldwide 
prosperity.
The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors. This publication is part of the overall programs 
of the Institute, as endorsed by its Board of Directors, but does not necessarily reflect the views of individual 
members of the Board or the Advisory Committee.
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Appendix A: Supplementary tables
Table A.1     IMF estimates of current account balance  
  in 2015 (percent of GDP)








Czech Republic –2.50 –0.27
Euro area –0.05 0.17



















United Kingdom –1.42 –1.09
United States –3.50 –3.34
WEO = International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook.
Source: Authors’ calculations.N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 2 6   No v e m b e r   2 0 1 0
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Table A.2     FEER-consistent and actual exchange rates against the dollar













Argentina 3.83 11.0 4.00 3.90 1.8 3.96 –1.1
Australia* 0.82 3.1 0.81 0.87 –5.5 0.98 –17.5
Brazil 1.81 5.2 1.85 1.81 0 1.68 –9.0
Canada 1.03 2.1 1.03 1.04 1.6 1.02 –1.2
Chile 518 3.7 525 535 3.3 485 –7.7
China 5.50 3.5 5.57 6.83 24.2 6.67 19.7
Colombia 1,956 3.2 1,978 1,985 1.5 1,810 –8.5
Czech Republic 19.6 2.3 19.8 20.5 4.3 17.7 –10.8
Euro area* 1.31 1.6 1.31 1.25 4.6 1.39 –5.7
Hong Kong 6.30 2.7 6.36 7.79 23.5 7.76 22.0
Hungary 211 3.5 214 221 4.7 197 –7.8
India 42.6 8.6 44.1 45.9 7.7 44.4 0.7
Indonesia 7,997 5.9 8,178 9,167 14.6 8,928 9.2
Israel 3.65 1.1 3.66 3.80 3.9 3.61 –1.4
Japan 84.0 –1.1 84.0 92.0 8.8 81.7 –2.7
Korea 1,066 3.0 1,077 1,167 9.5 1,122 4.2
Malaysia 2.52 2.2 2.54 3.25 29 3.10 22.1
Mexico 12.6 4.5 12.8 12.8 1.3 12.4 –2.8
New Zealand* 0.57 4.1 0.56 0.70 –18.3 0.75 –25.5
Philippines 40.8 4.5 41.5 45.6 11.8 43.4 4.5
Poland 3.11 2.4 3.14 3.24 4.2 2.84 –9.5
Singapore 0.96 4.1 0.98 1.39 44.9 1.30 32.9
South Africa 8.37 5.8 8.55 7.66 –8.5 6.91 –19.2
Sweden 6.80 1.6 6.83 7.72 13.5 6.68 –2.2
Switzerland 0.97 0.7 0.97 1.13 16.6 0.97 –0.1
Taiwan 26.2 2.3 26.4 31.8 21.4 30.8 16.7
Thailand 29.2 1.5 29.4 32.4 10.8 30.0 1.9
Turkey 1.65 7.6 1.70 1.55 –5.8 1.42 –16.2
United Kingdom* 1.53 2.6 1.52 1.46 4.5 1.60 –4.2
United States 1 0.5 1 1 0 1 0
* Dollars per currency unit. All others: currency unit per dollar.
FEER = fundamental equilibrium exchange rate
Note: Inflation = annual rate, December to December. Adjustment is for five months.
Source: Authors’ calculations.N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 2 6   No v e m b e r   2 0 1 0
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Appendix B: Sources for information on currency 
intervention
Economy Source
Variousa Beattie, Cadman, and Bernard (2010)
Canada McCrank (2010)
Czech Republic Winfrey and Tong (2010)
Eurozone Bremer, Vinocur, and Adler (2010)
Hungary Winfrey and Tong (2010)
India Krishnan and Antony (2010); Telegraph India
Korea Frangos (2010)
Malaysia Kinetz 2010
Mexico Gould and Barden (2010)




South Africa Stewart (2010); Mundy (2010)
Sweden Alder and Dobson (2010)
Switzerland Wille (2010)
a.  Argentina,  Australia,  Brazil,  Chile,  China,  Colombia,  Indonesia,  Israel,  Japan,  Korea, 
Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey.
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Table A.3     OECD and IMF estimates of the 





Czech Republic –3.7  n.a.
Euro Area –3.9 –2.5
Hungary –4.0  n.a.
Japan –2.1 –4.1
Mexico –1.9  n.a.
New Zealand –1.8 –1.8
Poland 0.8  n.a.
Sweden –6.0 –1.5
Switzerland –2.0  n.a.
United Kingdom –5.1 –2.3
United States –1.7 –4.3
OECD = Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
IMF = International Monetary Fund
n.a. = not available.
Sources: OECD (2010); IMF (2010).